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     UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
     SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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     CITY OF ROSEVILLE EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT SYSTEM, et al.,
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                   Plaintiffs,
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                                           09 CV 8633 (JGK)
                V.
     ENERGY SOLUTIONS, INC., et
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     al.,
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                   Defendants.
     -----x
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     BUILDING TRADES UNITED PENSION TRUST FUND, et al.,
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                   Plaintiffs,
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                                          09 CV 8648 (JGK)
                v.
     ENERGY SOLUTIONS, INC., et
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     al.,
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                  Defendants.
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                                            New York, N.Y.
                                            March 14, 2013
                                            11:20 a.m.
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     Before:
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                         HON. JOHN G. KOELTL,
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                                            District Judge
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                              APPEARANCES
     ROBBINS, GELLER, RUDMAN & DOWD
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          Attorneys for Lead Plaintiffs
     BY: EVAN J. KAUFMAN
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          SAMUEL H. RUDMAN
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          CODY R. LE JEUNE
21
     SIMPSON, THACHER & BARTLETT
          Attorneys for all Defendants except Underwriters
22
     BY: BRUCE D. ANGIOLILLO
          EVAN I. COHEN
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     SHEARMAN & STERLING, LLP
24
         Attorney for Defendant Underwriters
     BY: DANIEL C. LEWIS
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1 (In open court)

2 (Case called)

MR. KAUFMAN: Good morning, your Honor. Evan Kaufman with Robbins, Geller, Rudman and Dowd for the lead plaintiffs.

MR. RUDMAN: Good morning, your Honor. Samuel Rudman from Robbins, Geller, Rudman and Dowd for the lead plaintiffs.

MR. LE JEUNE: Good morning. Cody LeJeune, also for the lead plaintiffs.

THE COURT: Good morning.

MR. ANGIOLILLO: Good morning, your Honor. Bruce
Angiolillo and Evan Cohen from Simpson, Thacher and Bartlett
for all of the defendants, save the underwriter defendants.

MR. LEWIS: Your Honor, good morning. Daniel Lewis from Shearman and Sterling for the underwriter defendants.

THE COURT: Good morning. All right. The matter is on today for the approval of the distribution agreement and the application for attorneys' fees.

Is there anyone, any members of the class, who want to be heard on this? There were no objections and there was one exclusion, one opt out. So the only people here are the lawyers? All right. I'll listen to you.

MR. KAUFMAN: Your Honor, may I approach the podium?

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. KAUFMAN: We're seeking a final approval today of a \$26 million settlement of a securities class action that we

are pleased to bring before the Court. This was not the typical securities class action, where there was an announcement there were a large number of shareholders that filed cases. We were, in fact, the only plaintiffs to file complaints in this action, and at the lead plaintiff stage, only the lead plaintiffs to seek appointment as lead plaintiff. There were no other cases. There was no restatement. There was no governmental investigation. There was no SEC investigation. The entire settlement is due to the effort of lead plaintiffs and plaintiffs' counsel.

Another thing that sets this case apart is the complexity of the legal and factual issues. Energy Solutions is a company that specializes in the nuclear waste disposal business, which is highly specialized and very, very difficult to understand. As a result, in order for us to gain an appreciation underlying the facts in the claim, we retained an expert in the nuclear industry from the outset of this case in order to help us formulate our allegations.

This case also presented difficult legal issues, including the fact that one of the core allegations centered around the defendant's opinions about whether a petition before the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, an agency, would be approved or not. And we sufficiently pled those allegations and provided ample support in the complaint for those.

This was a case that most of the lawyers likely

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dismiss as not worth their time, but we took the risk. We stepped forward, spent the time and spent the money in order to attempt to prosecute the claims. We then overcame very strong opposition from the defendants at the motion to dismiss stage. Defendants launched a number of arguments against the complaint.

The complaint was sustained in most part, and we believe we have obtained a favorable ruling from your Honor on many issues. An important issue was the interpretation in the application of the recent Janus opinion, and one of the key holdings in that application was that there could be more than one speaker of a statement under Janus, which has already been cited by other courts as precedent.

At the direction of the Court at the motion to dismiss hearing, we discussed settlement with defendants. In December of 2011 we attended a mediation before former federal Judge Layn Phillips, who's a very, very experienced mediator in any type of matters. And even though we were there for an entire day, we were unable to resolve the action, and then we proceeded to aggressively litigate the case.

We proceeded for discovery for months. We saw documents. We reviewed over 600,000 pages of documents, analyzed those documents that were produced by the defendants, as well as numerous --

THE COURT: There was only one deposition taken,

right?

MR. KAUFMAN: There was one deposition taken of Energy Solutions in connection with fact discovery, and then during the class certification stage, each of the lead plaintiffs was deposed.

And then, in September 2011 -- 2012, we attended a second mediation, where we made some more progress, but we were still unable to settle. But then we continued negotiations after that, and then on the eve of the class certification hearing, we were able to reach an agreement in principle to resolve the claims.

We respectfully submit that the settlement is fair, adequate and reasonable. On December 3rd, 2012, the Court preliminarily approved the settlement, and pursuant to the Court's order, we published a notice on December 17th, 2012, over the Business Wire, and on December 18th, 2012, in the Investor's Business Daily. The notice informed investors of the opportunity to participate in the lawsuit and to object or opt out of the lawsuit. And we advised them of our application for attorneys' fees and the reimbursement of expenses, as well as reimbursements of expenses to lead plaintiffs.

We also mailed over 24,000 notices and claims packages to class members. And on December 14th, 2012, the claims administrator posted copies of the notice, proof of claim, revised settlement agreement, and the Court's preliminary

approval order on its website and set up a number for people to ask questions.

The class members are extremely — appear to be extremely pleased with the settlement because there have been no objections and only one class member has sought to be excluded. As such, the notice, we believe, was the best notice practicable under the circumstances, and we note that the notice satisfies Rule 23 and due process, and that the investors were thoroughly and properly informed of the settlement.

With respect to the factors of approval of the settlement, the first is whether the settlement was procedurally fair and, as a preliminary matter, due to the protracted litigation, the fact that the case went on for three years, we had two mediations and subsequent settlement negotiations, we would establish that the settlement was procedurally fair.

With respect to the substantive factors, your Honor is aware that the Second Circuit, in the Grinnell case, has set forth a number of factors which I can go through those with you, if you would like. The first is the complexity, expense and likely duration of the litigation. As I mentioned earlier, this was not a typical securities class action. It was very complex, both factually and legally. And the case was litigated for an extended period of time, for three years,

before settlement.

We also participated in document discovery and deposition of Energy Solutions, and we were proceeding to seek additional depositions at the time the case settled.

The reaction to the class has been very positive. So far, preliminary numbers from the claims administrator indicate that over 3,400 claims have been submitted so far, which is approximately 14 percent of the notices that were mailed. And also, based upon our damage expert's analysis of the number of damage shares, the claims represent approximately 41 percent of the damaged shares that have already submitted claims in the settlement.

The third factor is the state of the proceedings and the amount of discovery completed. I already provided some detail about that, but the lead counsel had a clear picture at the time of the settlement of the strengths and weaknesses of the case and the defenses that defendants were going to propose. So it was a very, very well-informed decision to settle at the time that we did.

The fourth factor is the risk of establishing liability. Inherent in any securities class action is a risk proving liability and the same thing applied here. While there are various risks, the biggest risk to our case had to do with scienter, of proving that the defendants did not believe that it was likely that the NRC would approve Energy Solution's

petition. And regardless of what the document said or what the allegations were in the complaint, that would have ultimately come down to a credibility issue at trial, which is always difficult. You never know how that's going to turn out.

The fifth would be the risk of establishing damages. In any types of case like this, there's a risk of establishing damages. It's a battle of experts. But, here, the stock drop of Energy Solutions happened around the same time of the financial crisis and the downward — when the market lost a lot of value as a result of that. So defendants would have asserted that a large portion of the damages were attributable to the financial crisis and not the fraud that we allege in the case.

And sixth would be the risk of maintaining the class action through trial. Right before we settled, class certification was fully briefed. We believe that we would have obtained a favorable ruling on class certification, and that lead plaintiffs would have been appointed. However, there are always risks to that. You never know what could happen, and even if the class was certified and the lead plaintiffs were appointed, that could always be reversed until trial.

The seventh factor is the ability of the defendants to obtain a judgment. Normally, that's not a consideration, but here, it actually was a consideration. At the time that we were negotiating the settlement, Energy Solutions was having a

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lot of financial problems. They laid off hundreds of employees, their debt was downgraded, and they fired their CEO, their CFO. There was a big turnover. They lost some major business, and there was a real risk that the company could face bankruptcy.

So it was an opportune time to settle as well. well as, looking at the value of the settlement, we believe that we obtained the most that we could obtain from this case.

THE COURT: Your estimate is that the amount of the settlement is 14 percent of your damages expert's best-case scenario for damages?

MR. KAUFMAN: Correct. That's a best-case scenario of about 186 million, which, when you compare it to other settlements in this range, it's much higher. The meaner average is the 2 to 3 percent range; so this is substantially higher than that.

THE COURT: Well, it varies.

MR. KAUFMAN: It does vary, it does. But we believe this is a very, very good settlement and that the response of the class so far, the 41 percent of damaged shares, have raised submitted claim forms, we believe, supports that as well.

And when you look at the market capitalization of the company, the settlement at the time of when we settled was worth approximately 10 percent of the total market capitalization of Energy Solutions.

And the ninth factor is a range of reasonableness of the settlement to a possible recovery. And for all the aforementioned reasons, we believe that the recovery of 26 million is reasonable, in light of the risk that the case would be dismissed, the class may not be certified or would not be certified, and that Energy Solutions could have continued its downward business spiral.

So as a result, your Honor, we respectfully submit the settlement is fair, reasonable and adequate, and we request that your Honor approve the settlement.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. KAUFMAN: If there aren't any other questions about the settlement, I'd like to move to the plan of distribution.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. KAUFMAN: Okay. We also request that the Court find that the plan of allocation of the settlement fund is fair and reasonable and should be approved. If the Court approves the post-settlement upon completion of the claims filing process, and today is the last date for class members to submit claims, the net settlement fund will be distributed to members of the class according to the plan of distribution.

The plan of distribution, which was described in detail and explained in the declaration of Bjorn Steinholt, our expert who put together the plan of distribution, has a

rational basis and was formulated by lead counsel in consultation with Mr. Steinholt, our expert, assuring its fairness and reliability. And we believe that the plan of distribution is fair and reasonable and request that it be approved by the Court.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. KAUFMAN: With respect to attorneys' fees, your Honor --

THE COURT: Before we reach the issue of attorneys' fees, do the defendants want to be heard on the fairness of the settlement and the plan of distribution?

MR. ANGIOLILLO: Your Honor, we have nothing to add.

MR. LEWIS: We have nothing to add either, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. KAUFMAN: As your Honor is aware, the Goldberger factors are factors that are applied to the request for attorneys' fees in a case such as this. Many of the factors overlap with those of approval of a settlement. So what I would like to do would be just to go over the factors that don't overlap, if that's okay with your Honor, because we essentially set forth our arguments in our papers as well.

First would be the time and labor expended by counsel.

Before I get into that, we are seeking 27 percent of the settlement as attorneys' fees, in addition to the reimbursement of expenses, as well plus interest, as well as reimbursement of

expenses for each of the lead plaintiffs.

As a preliminary matter, the legal fees we're seeking were disclosed in the notice, and not a single class member has objected or voiced any type of concern for the amount that we're seeking. And the fee was also approved by each of the lead plaintiffs as set forth in each of their declarations that was filed with the Court.

With respect to the time and labor expended by counsel, we have expended time and effort pursuing this action. We litigated the case before, as I mentioned, for three years, and we devoted over 4,800 hours to this action. And as discussed in detail in my declaration that I submitted to the Court in connection with the final approval, we conducted, even before filing the complaint, an extensive investigation, consulted extensively with our nuclear regulatory expert, formed an investigation of confidential witnesses, numerous former employees, other industry personnel, and aggressively litigated the case for three years.

THE COURT: But in fairness, it was still the beginning of the discovery process in the sense that there would have been miles to go in the litigation. There was only one deposition of the defendant. If the case had been litigated to the end and the same result obtained at the end, the multiplier would have been far less, right? Hours would have been much higher, multiplier far less.

MR. KAUFMAN: Well, your Honor, had the case gone further -- We recognize where the case settled in the litigation. Had the case gone further, we would have sought a higher percentage of legal fees. Courts regularly award a higher amount, 30 to 33 percent, and that's why we're seeking 27 percent.

THE COURT: You're awfully close to the 30 percent and you say, sure, there are cases, there are a lot of cases, which award 30 percent or 33 percent. There are also a lot of cases that award 10 percent, 12 percent, depending upon what the amount of the recovery is and what the multiplier is, and how do you compare those two? Right?

And, in short, you can come up with a litany of cases that award 30 percent or 33-and-a-third percent. You could also come up with a litany of cases that award 10 percent and 12 percent, and you can come up with a litany of cases that award a multiplier of 3 and more. But you can also come up with a litany of cases that award a much lower multiplier.

And ultimately the issue is, under all of the factors, what's a fair and reasonable fee under all of the circumstances of this case, given the amount of time that was spent on the case, given the risks that counsel took on. It was plainly a contingent case. It had great risk. The effectiveness of counsel of getting a good settlement, the lack of objections of the class, the sophistication of the clients.

One issue for me is a multiplier of three against what is a reasonable, frankly, attorney's fee. \$685 an hour, for example, produces an hourly fee of over \$1,800. That is a -- that is a substantial fee, and that's only using your hourly fee. It's not even higher hourly fees, and the case was litigated efficiently by using a lower hourly fee than a higher hourly fee when I go over all of the hours. So it's a concern.

MR. RUDMAN: Judge, can I interrupt for one second, and say something?

THE COURT: If you must.

MR. RUDMAN: Because I'm the higher hourly fee.

THE COURT: I know that.

MR. RUDMAN: I gave Evan the presentation because he was the primary litigator on the case, but I wanted to come today. We've had many cases in front of your Honor, and I, obviously, know your Honor's views on attorneys' fees. And this is — and I think Evan said a little bit of it in his presentation. I mean, our view is here, we understand where you've come out on the prior cases on multipliers, and what we're seeking here in terms of that range is on the high end of what your Honor's ever approved.

But if there's going to be a case where you should approve it, your Honor, it's this case, and I'll tell you why. And you've got some of it in Evan's presentation. The 10, the 12 percent case, the low-multiplier case that you're referring

to is where there's a big case or a restatement case. There's many lawyers come in and there's a wealth of counsel willing to take the case and litigate the case, and although those cases had risk, they don't have the same risk that we had in this case.

And I think the point of what Evan was saying about the complexity of the case was this was a case that wasn't going to be brought if our clients didn't bring it and we didn't bring it. It was also a case -- Now, you can say that about a lot of cases, but then you have to look at the facts of the case. It was a case that ultimately challenged the determination of a governmental agency that had nothing to do with the defendants.

So it was an incredibly -- this was a -- Most securities lawyers that would look at this case wouldn't even give it the time of day because they would say, How on earth could anyone know what the governmental agency, how they were going to turn out.

And so, in my view, your Honor, it's not your typical securities case. It was highly complex, highly creative, and if there's ever a case where your Honor is going to see fit to reward the lawyers for pursuing a complex and difficult case, I respectfully submit that this is the case.

THE COURT: To allay some of your concerns, this is not a case where I think that the proper percentage of recovery

is down at 10 and 12 percent. It's not. It's substantially higher. But I look at these figures very carefully. I look at the percentage. I look at the amount of work that was done. I look at the multiplier. I look at the different work. I look at the efficiency.

I look at all of that and, yes, this is a case that pushes towards the higher end, but I still have trouble with the precise place where you have come out, and it's my responsibility to, you know, make the determination and ultimately be satisfied that taking all of the factors into account, the ultimate fee is the fair and reasonable fee, given all of the factors.

And, in fact, I go one step further, where I would come out with the 25 percent rather than 20 percent, which I still think is towards the high end of the range, but it brings the multiplier down some, and it still results in a high hourly fee.

On the other hand, I appreciate the argument on the other side, that lawyers shouldn't be encouraged to conduct a case inefficiently by building up the hours for purposes of bringing down the multiplier; so I understand.

MR. RUDMAN: Or pushing it further than it needs to go because we need to -- but, your Honor, I appreciate your comments and I understand. Sorry for interrupting.

MR. KAUFMAN: Unless your Honor has additional

questions about our attorneys' fees, I respectfully request that our 27 percent, although your Honor has expressed 25 percent, be approved.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. KAUFMAN: Finally, with respect to reimbursement of expenses. We're requesting \$257,889.10 in expenses incurred while prosecuting this action. We submitted a declaration regarding these figures. We're also seeking reimbursement of expenses for lead plaintiffs. For the Building Trades of more than \$2,100; the New England Carpenter's fund, a little more than \$2,500; and for the City of Roseville, a little more than \$1,700.

And then one final matter is that local counsel for New England Carpenter's Fund, a firm of Krakow and Souris, who's not on the papers, they expended a little over \$4,000 worth of time, and we would be willing to pay that out of our attorneys' fees, if it's okay with your Honor.

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. KAUFMAN: Unless your Honor has any additional questions about the expenses, I just want to move on to class certification.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. KAUFMAN: Okay.

THE COURT: It's class certification solely for purposes of the settlement, right?

1 MR. KAUFMAN: Correct, your Honor. THE COURT: So the pending motion for class 2 3 certification gets dismissed without prejudice as moot because that was class certification for the entire action, not just 4 5 settlement? 6 So we're just requesting that the MR. KAUFMAN: Yes. 7 Court approve the class -- certified class for purposes of the settlement. 8 9 THE COURT: Okay. 10 MR. KAUFMAN: And unless your Honor has any additional 11 questions, I'm finished. 12 THE COURT: Thank you. Do the --13 MR. KAUFMAN: Oh, your Honor, one housekeeping matter. 14 We submitted an order in connection with the attorneys' fees, 15 which we believe that when, as we were preparing for the hearing, it appeared that you didn't like that type of order in 16 17 another case. 18 THE COURT: It was very good. I've taken your order, and I've crossed out all of the --19 20 MR. RUDMAN: The same language you crossed out the 21 last time, Judge? 22 THE COURT: -- all the pans to what a great job you've 23 done and how sophisticated the defense lawyers were and --24 MR. ANGIOLILLO: Excuse me, your Honor, may I be heard

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on that?

MR. RUDMAN: We brought a clean one because we realized we made a mistake.

THE COURT: Oh, okay. I've marked it all up.

MR. RUDMAN: That's okay.

MR. KAUFMAN: Okay.

MR. RUDMAN: Thank you.

MR. KAUFMAN: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: I may not have crossed out all of the same things.

All right. I'll sign the final judgment. This is a fair and reasonable settlement. It's procedurally fair. The recitations in the final judgment are correct. It was negotiated by experienced counsel at arm's length with the assistance of a mediator. There had been substantial litigation, including a motion to dismiss, a fully briefed but undecided motion for class action certification. There was a great deal of documentary discovery.

The settlement was substantively fair. The case was complex. It's significant that there were no objections from class. The lead plaintiffs are sophisticated investors and no other members of the class objected and only one individual opted out. That's a substantial approval record on behalf of the class.

There were risks in the case. Some of the case was dismissed on the motion to dismiss and the remaining issues in

the case were always subject to the reasonable risks of litigation. The recovery is 14 percent of the damages estimated, best-case damages estimated by the plaintiff's counsel, which is a reasonable recovery. There's an advantage to the payment now; so that procedurally and substantively this is a fair and reasonable result. The notice to the class was the best notice reasonably possible, and the plan of distribution is fair.

I've already indicated that with respect to attorneys' fees, this is a case where a percentage of recovery is reasonable. 25 percent is a reasonable recovery. There are recoveries higher; there are many recoveries lower. It certainly depends upon the amount of the recovery, the stage in the litigation, and the other factors that I already indicated. As counsel indicated, this is higher than the percentage recovery that I've done in some other cases.

On the other hand, the case was efficiently litigated and the plaintiffs are sophisticated. No plaintiff has objected to the settlement, the percentage. It was in the notice so that anyone could object to the size of the recovery for the attorneys' fees.

There are some factors which would indicate that the percentage recovery should be towards the higher end of the percentage of recovery, including the difficulty of the case, the fact that there was no prior government investigation, the

fact that there were no other competing plaintiffs for this particular case, the reasonableness of the settlement, the efficiency with which it was conducted.

25 percent brings the lodestar down to somewhat under 3, which is a fair load — a fair multiplier on the number of hours times the rates. I appreciate the Court of Appeals doesn't like the term lodestar; so hours times rates, and as counsel has already appreciated, I've already marked up the order to reflect the factors that went in to arriving at the amount.

Let me ask counsel one question. Giving a percentage of 25 percent, there's no -- I believe I caught all the 27 percents. Plaintiff counsel sought 27 percent. I'll order 25 percent. There's no actual calculation of the 27 percent, right, at any point?

MR. KAUFMAN: I don't believe so, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. You're welcome to look at the order.

MR. KAUFMAN: Your Honor, paragraph 6 we have identified 27 percent twice, and paragraph 8E there's a 27 percent, and paragraph 8F there's a 27 percent.

THE COURT: I'm sorry, hold on. Yes, 8E and?

MR. KAUFMAN: F.

THE COURT: 8F.

MR. KAUFMAN: And then there was the multiplier amount

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in 8F.
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               THE COURT: Yes, I've crossed that out.
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               MR. KAUFMAN: And also paragraph 4 on Page 1.
               THE COURT: No, that still stays. That was as sought.
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               MR. KAUFMAN: Okay.
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               THE COURT: All right. I've signed the orders.
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     Anything else?
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               MR. KAUFMAN: Not from plaintiffs, your Honor.
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               THE COURT: Okay. I'll make copies so that you can
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     have them now rather than waiting for them to go up on EFC.
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      They'll go up on ECF later today. Okay. Good morning, all.
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               MR. KAUFMAN: Thank you, your Honor.
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               (Adjourned)
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